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∗ †
Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to derive a procedure to evaluate a group
of alternatives or units considered as systems where a certain transformation process
consums heteregenous input attributes or items (to be understood in a broad sense
including eﬀort that must be done, a negative impact, consumable resources, ...) to
produce or deliver heteregenous output items (including subjective satisfaction, tan-
gible products, beneﬁcial impact, ...). In general, many actors with diﬀerent points
of view as well as diﬀerent information sources more or less reliable will be involved
in the evaluation process. The evaluation context we consider here consists in stake-
holders (decission makers, experts, users, ...) that give their opinion regarding the
impact of each item with regard to the evaluation goal ; the information or data (val-
ues of items for diﬀerent alternatives) about items are collected from or supplied by
diﬀerent more or less reliable information or data sources (news papers, magazines,
web, agencies and consulting cabinets, experts, ...). The established model aims to
integrate the interactions between these diﬀerent components (stakeholders, items,
information sources and alternatives) and consists bassically for each alternative or
unit in computing two measures: an aggregated measure known as the selectability
at the output of the system and an aggregated measure at the input known as the
rejectability in the framework of satisﬁcing game theory. The derivation of these
measures is carried up by a pairwise comparison process using the analytic network
process (ANP) approach, an extension of the well known analytic hierarchy process
(AHP), that allows to take into account complex interactions of evaluation process
components such as dependency and feedback.
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Fusion, Satisﬁcing Game Theory, Analytic Network Process, AHP, DEA.
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1 Introduction
The problem of evaluating the performance of an alternative or a unit within a group
of alternatives with regard to a goal is of great importance for eﬃcient decision making
(choosing, sorting or ranking alternatives) regarding this group. Here, we understand
by alternative a place where a certain transformation process (in a broad sense)
consumes some input items (resources) to produce some output items (deliveries) as
shown by Figure 1; consumption and production must be understood in a very broad
way and can be represented respectively by the eﬀort one must furnish, negative
impact one must tolerates, prize one must pay, ... to obtain some satisfaction, some
goods, ... A typical alternative or unit could be a hospital, a manufacturing plant, a
TRANSFORMATION
PROCESS
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(Deliveries)
Figure 1: A typical transformation process or system
university, a police department, a restaurant, a call center, a physical object (a car, a
computer, a house, ...), or a non physical thing (job, project, ..), etc.. Evaluating an
alternative is always a relative process, that is, its resource utilization versus its output
performance will be compared to other alternatives of the same kind. Classically, the
evaluation process is carried by computing an absolute eﬃcient index e
u
for each
alternative or unit u, from a set or universe U , using equation (1)
e
u
=
∑
m
o
j=1
O(u, j)
∑
m
i
i=1
I(u, i)
; (1)
where I(u, i) is the value of the input item i (i = 1, 2, ..., m
i
) used by the unit u to
deliver m
o
output items valued by O(u, j) (the value of the output item j produced
by the unit u). This approach has some serious drawbacks such as the fact that, in
general, all input items or output items do not have the same importance with regard
to the evaluation goal and even by trying to weight them to obtain an eﬃciency index
as given by equation (2),
e
u
=
∑
m
o
j=1
α
j
u
O(u, j)
∑
m
i
i=1
β
i
u
I(u, i)
, α
j
u
, β
i
u
> 0; (2)
there still exists the problem of determining relative weights α
j
u
and β
i
u
. A serious
attempt to overcome these drawbacks comes from data envelopment analysis (DEA)
established by [1]. It is an extreme point method that determines weights α
j
u
and
β
i
u
in order to deﬁne a relative eﬃciency of each alternative compared to the best
one (possibly virtual) by solving linear programs (see for instance [3] for deﬁnition
of linear programming concepts). Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a technique
for assessing and ranking the performance of corporations, research projects or other
entities where an entire array of indicators of performance are to be evaluated. It was
invented by [1] and is a linear programming based technique for measuring the relative
performance of systems where the presence of multiple inputs and outputs makes
comparisons diﬃcult. It is an extreme point method and compares each system (also
known in the DEA literature as producer or decision making unit (DMU)) with only
the “best” one (possibly virtual). A fundamental assumption behind the DEAmethod
is that if a given DMU, A, is capable of delivering Y (A) in the output with X(A) as
inputs, then other systems should also be able to do the same if they were to operate
eﬃciently. The procedure of ﬁnding the best virtual producer can be formulated as a
linear program. Analyzing the eﬃciency of n producers then requires solving n linear
programming problems. The following formulation is one of the standard forms for
the DEA. We consider that there are n producers, m
i
input items and m
o
output
items for each producer; the value of input item i and the value of output item j for
producer u are I(u, i) and O(u, j) respectively. The n linear programming problems
to be solved are deﬁned by equation (3)
max
α
j
u
, β
i
u
∑
m
o
j=1
α
j
u
O(u, j)
∑
m
0
j=1
α
j
v
O(v, j)−
∑
m
i
i=1
β
i
v
I(v, i) ≤ 0, 1 ≤ v ≤ n, v = u
∑
m
i
i=1
β
i
u
I(u, i) = 1
α
j
u
, β
i
u
≥ ε, 1 ≤ u ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤m
o
, 1 ≤ i ≤m
i
1 ≤ u ≤ n
, (3)
where ε denotes a small strictly positive real number. The DEA method has been ap-
plied in many situations such as: health care (hospitals, doctors), education (schools,
universities), banks, manufacturing, benchmarking, management evaluation, fast food
restaurants, retail stores, police departments (see for instance [9], [22], [23], [25]). The
power of the DEA as a tool for performance evaluation is due to the following charac-
teristics (see for instance [7] and references therein for applications of this method).
• DEA can handle multiple input and multiple output models.
• It doesn’t require an assumption of a functional form relating inputs to outputs.
• DMUs are directly compared against the best (possibly virtual) DMU.
• Inputs and outputs can have very diﬀerent units.
But the DEA method does have a number of drawbacks reported in the literature
among which are the following concerns.
• A judicious choice of weights will lead to a high proportion of units being eﬃcient
rendering the method less discriminatory. For instance a unit which has the
highest ratio of one of the outputs to one of the inputs will be eﬃcient, or have
an eﬃciency which is very close to one by putting as much weight as possible
on that ratio and the minimum weight (ε) on the other inputs and outputs. As
it is probable to ﬁnd such ratio for many units, the eﬃcient units set will be
large. So a unit can appear eﬃcient simply because of its pattern of inputs and
outputs and not because of any inherent eﬃciency. To overcome this problem,
some authors propose to apply weights restriction (see [6]) or to incorporate
maximum weights on outputs (see [10]) approaches that are diﬃcult to justify
in practice.
• Since DEA is an extreme point technique, noise (even symmetrical noise with
zero mean) such as measurement error can cause signiﬁcant deviations that
make the method not robust.
• Since a standard formulation of the DEA creates a separate linear program for
each DMU, large problems will be obviously computationally intensive.
Besides the technical drawbacks raised concerning DEA approach, there is an im-
portant issue that was not raised yet: to apply DEA approach or the classical absolute
index (1) approach to which it succeeds, items (input items as well as output ones)
are required to take numerical values whereas in practice decision makers face het-
erogeneous (quantitative and/or qualitative) characterization of items. Furthermore,
in general, decision makers or the analyst (one who is in charge of building the eval-
uation model) need experts, that do not have the same sensitivity regarding each
item nor are competent to evaluate them, to give an opinion about the importance of
each item with regard to the evaluation goal. Finally information that characterizes
alternatives with regard to items will be collected from diﬀerent sources that are more
or less reliable and the established model must take into account all these concerns.
The approaches used to build evaluation models that take into account some of
concerns that are not considered by DEA approach are methods from multicriteria
decision making (MCDM) literature, see [2], [11], [12], [14], [17], [24] and references
therein. These methods can be regrouped into two main categories.
• Evaluation models based on value function(s): roughly speaking, these tech-
niques consider a numerical function π deﬁned on the universe U such that
π(u) ≥ π(v)⇔ u  v (4)
where “u  v” stands for “u is at least as good, with regard to the evaluation
goal, as v or u dominates v” leading to a weak order. The evaluation model-
ing process then consists in building such a function based on the interactions
between diﬀerent components of decision process; there are many techniques
employed in the literature for constructing such a function where a number of
them suppose a particular form for π such as expected utility or additive value
function (see [2], [12], [17], [11], [24] and references therein).
• Evaluation models allowing incomparability and/or intransitivity known in the
literature as outranking methods such as the family of ELECTRE procedures
and PROMETHEE techniques (see [2] [11] [24]); these techniques necessitate in
general iterative interaction between decision makers and the analyst.
Let us notify before continuing that the methods evoked here correspond to the
discrete universe U case; the classical methods for continuous universe case include
for instance goal and compromise programming and a recent study by the author (see
[21]) applies the satisﬁcing game approach for this later case.
Another issue raised by DEA approach is the spirit of comparing each unit to the
“best one” and our main objection with regard to the majority of techniques from
multicriteria decision making literature is that they do not make diﬀerence in the
comparison procedure between negative criteria (input items) and positive criteria
(output items). We do think that, to evaluate units, humans often evaluate each unit
ﬁrstly with regard to how eﬃciently it uses its resources to produce its output and
secondly they look at how good this unit is compared to its counterparts. If we think
of how students are evaluated, we see that each student is ﬁrst evaluated individually
(their marks reﬂecting the eﬀort they have made) and then compared to the best
student of the same class. Of course if there are intangible aspects in the character-
ization of units, they will introduce some preemptivity that must be given priority
in the evaluation process so that the approach we are considering here concerns only
input and output items that are pairwise comparable respectively. This observation
suggests that an alternative should be evaluated by comparing its deliveries (out-
put performance) to its resources consumption at ﬁrst and with regard to the other
alternatives in a second stage. A framework that seems interesting to tackle this
problem with is the recently developed satisﬁcing game theory [18] that, basically for
our problem, will consist in deﬁning selectability (with regard to output items) and
rejectability (with regard to input items) functions or measures known as satisﬁability
functions. An eﬃcient unit will be that for which the selectability is at least equal
to the rejectability. This approach has been developed and applied with success to a
real world problem in [20] for the case of numerical valuation of input/output items.
The satisﬁability functions here will depend on the interactions between stakehold-
ers, items, information sources and alternatives so that the analytic network process
(ANP), see [13], a generalization of the analytic hierarchy process (AHP, see [12]), will
be used to derive such functions that capture the complex interdependencies between
elements of the evaluation context.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the second section the
elements of the satisﬁcing game theory that are relevant to our problem are presented;
the third section is devoted to a recall of analytic network process method; the fourth
section shows how the performance evaluation problems described in the introduction
section can be formulated using satisﬁcing game approach and the analytic network
process; the section ﬁve presents potential applications of the approach considered so
far and ﬁnally a conclusion is presented in the sixth section.
2 Satisﬁcing game theory
The underlying philosophy of the DEA approach for performance evaluation is sub-
stantive rationality i.e., looking for the best. But the substantive rationality paradigm
is not necessarily the way humans evaluate options (and maybe not the best one).
Most of the time humans content themselves with options that are just “good enough”;
the concept of being good enough allows a certain ﬂexibility because one can always
adjust one’s aspiration level. On the other hand, decision makers more probably tend
to classify units as good enough or not good enough in terms of their positive at-
tributes (beneﬁt) and their negative attributes (cost) with regard to the evaluation
goal instead of ranking units with regard to each other. For instance, to evaluate
cars, we often make a list of positive attributes (driving comfort, speed, robustness,
etc.) and a list of negative attributes (price, petrol consumption, maintainability,
etc.) of each car and then make a list of cars for which positive attributes “exceed”
negative attributes in some sense. This way of evaluation falls into the framework
of praxeology or the study of the theory of practical activity (the science of eﬃcient
action) derived from epistemic logic (the branch of philosophy that classiﬁes propo-
sitions on the basis of knowledge and belief regarding their content; for a proposition
to be admissible it must be both believable and informative) and developed by [18].
Here decision maker(s), instead of looking for the best options, look for the satisﬁc-
ing options. This approach for decision making is rather close to Simon’s theory of
bounded rationality (see for instance [16]) who suggests to change the optimization
paradigm by the satisfaction one as one will never get all the necessary information
regarding relationships of diﬀerent components of a decision problem nor have enough
computing power to search for the optimal solution so that one can content himself
with options that satisfy its aspiration’s level.
Satisﬁcing is a term that refers to a decision making strategy where options, units
or alternatives are selected which are “good enough” instead of being the best [18].
Let us consider a universe U of options, alternatives or units; then for each unit
u ∈ U , a selectability function p
s
(u) and a rejectability function p
r
(u) are deﬁned so
that p
s
(u) measures the degree to which u works towards success in achieving the
decision maker’s goal and p
r
(u) is the cost associated with this unit. This pair of
measures called satisﬁability functions are in general normalized on U . The following
deﬁnition then gives the set of options which can be considered to be “good enough”
because, for these options, the “beneﬁt” expressed by the function p
s
exceeds the
“cost” expressed by the function p
r
with regard to an index of caution q.
Deﬁnition 1 The satisﬁcing set Σ
q
⊆ U is the set of units deﬁned by equation (5)
Σ
q
= {u ∈ U : p
s
(u) ≥ qp
r
(u)} . (5)
Small values of the index of caution q will lead to lot of units being declared
satisﬁcing whereas large values of q will reduce the number of satisﬁcing units. A
sensitivity analysis can be carried up to determine the value q
min
below which all the
units of U will be declared satisﬁcing and a value q
max
above which non unit will be
satisﬁcing. For all units of U to be declared satisﬁcing the following inequality (6)
p
s
(u) ≥ qp
r
(u) ∀ u ∈ U ⇔ q ≤ q
min
= min
u∈U
(
p
s
(u)
p
r
(u)
)
(6)
must be veriﬁed so that for such an index of caution q we have
Σ
q
= U . (7)
---
On the contrary, there is no satisﬁcing unit, that is
Σ
q
= ∅ (8)
if and only if the following inequality (9)
p
s
(u) < qp
r
(u) ∀ u ∈ U ⇔ q > q
max
= max
u∈U
(
p
s
(u)
p
r
(u)
)
(9)
is veriﬁed. Finally if the index of caution veriﬁes q ∈
[
q
min
, q
max
]
then
Σ
q
⊆ U . (10)
But for a satisﬁcing unit u there can exist other satisﬁcing units that are better
(having more selectability and at most the same rejectability or having less rejectabil-
ity and at least the same selectability) than u; it is obvious that in this case any
rational decision maker will prefer the latter units. So the interesting set is that
containing satisﬁcing units for which there are no better units: this is called the sat-
isﬁcing equilibrium set E
S
q
. To deﬁne this set, let us deﬁne ﬁrst, for any unit u ∈ U ,
the set B(u) of units that are strictly better than u (or strictly dominate u)
B(u) = B
s
(u) ∪ B
r
(u), (11)
where B
s
(u) and B
r
(u) are deﬁned as:
B
s
(u) = {v ∈ U : p
r
(v) < p
r
(u) and p
s
(v) ≥ p
s
(u)} ,
B
r
(u) = {v ∈ U : p
r
(v) ≤ p
r
(u) and p
s
(v) > p
s
(u)} .
Concretely if v ∈ B(u), it means that either “p
r
(v) < p
r
(u) and p
s
(v) ≥ p
s
(u)” or
“p
r
(v) ≤ p
r
(u) and p
s
(v) > p
s
(u)” that is v does better in terms of rejectability and
in terms of selectability than u. The equilibrium set E (units for which there are no
strictly better units) is deﬁned by equation (12)
E = {u ∈ U : B(u) = ∅} (12)
and then the satisﬁcing equilibrium set, E
s
q
, is given by equation (13)
E
s
q
= E ∩Σ
q
. (13)
In the next section we will present elements of the analytic network process ap-
proach that are relevant to compute, given an evaluation problem, the satisﬁability
measures p
s
(u) and p
r
(u) for each alternative u that will be used to construct the
value function π on the universe U .
3 Analytic Network Process
The Analytic Network Process (ANP) is an extension of the Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP) which allows the incorporation of the interdependency between el-
ements being compared. The analytic hierarchy process is a comprehensive, powerful
---
and ﬂexible decision making process to help people set priorities and make the best
decision when both qualitative and quantitative aspects are used to evaluate alterna-
tives, see [12]. By reducing complex decisions to a series of one-on-one comparisons,
then synthesizing the results, AHP not only helps decision makers arrive at the best
decision, but also provides a clear rationale that it is the best. It is designed to re-
ﬂect the way people actually think and is a widely used decision-making theory. The
basic AHP decomposes a decision problems in diﬀerent elements, grouped in clusters,
that it arranges in a linear hierarchy form where the top element of the hierarchy is
the overall goal of the decision making. The hierarchy goes from the general to more
particular until a level of operational criteria against which the decision alternatives
can be evaluated is reached. The elements of cluster C
c
in a top down hierarchy
are pairwise compared with regard to each element of the cluster C
c−1
to obtain the
weighting n
c
×n
c−1
matrixW
c
where n
i
is the number of elements in the cluster C
i
.
This matrix is given by equation (14)
W
c
=
[
w
1
c
w
2
c
... w
n
c−1
c
]
(14)
where w
i
c
are n
c
column vectors obtained as follows: for each element i of the cluster
C
c−1
, a pairwise comparison matrix W
i
c
of elements of cluster C
c
is constructed by
answering questions of the form “how important is elementX compared to the element
Y of the cluster C
c
with regard to upper level element Z of the cluster C
c−1
?” using
the scales given by the following Table I (see [12], [13])
Verbal scale Numerical values
Equally important 1
Moderately more important 3
Strongly more important 5
Very strongly more important 7
Extremely more important 9
Intermediate scales (compromise) 2, 4, 6, 8
Table I: scales for AHP comparison procedure.
Once this matrix is constructed, the vector w
i
c
is computed as the unique eigen-
vector of this matrix associated with eigenvalue λ
max
(
W
i
c
)
(the maximum eigenvalue
of the corresponding matrix), that is the solution of the equation (15)
W
i
c
w
i
c
= λ
max
(
W
i
c
)
w
i
c
(15)
and an inconsistency
1
measure is calculated to evaluate the consistency of the decision
maker when eliciting the judgements (see [13]). The overall weights vector ω of the
bottom cluster, that is the alternatives cluster, with regard to the decision goal is
then given by the following equation (16)
ω =W
N
W
N−1
...W
1
(16)
1
A comparison matrix M is said to be consistent if it veriﬁes: M
ii
= 1, M
ji
=
1
M
ij
and M
ik
=
M
ij
M
jk
.
where W 1 is a column vector representing the comparison weights of the first cluster 
,vith regard to the overall decision goal and W N (N is the number of clusters) is 
the comparison matrix of alternatives with regard to the direct upper level cluster 
elements (measurable criteria) . The methodology of ARP (see [12]) assumes the 
inner and outer independence between elements, thus the hierarcliy that represents 
the problems corresponds to directed graph (for instance Figure 2), where the arrows 
mean dependency; elements that are pointed by an arrow are evaluated against the 
elements from whicl1 the arrow emanate. 
Goal 
Alternatives 
Figure 2 : A typical ARP organization of a decision problem 
By so doing, AHP approacl1 elinlinates the possibilities of feedback and iner-
dependency. The Analytic Network Process (see [13]) abandons the requirement 
of linear dependence; here loops and feedback are allowed. The Analytic Network 
Process allows both interaction and feedback ,vithin clusters of elements (inner de-
pendence) and between clusters (outer dependence) . Sucl1 feedback best captures the 
complex effects of interplay in human society, especially when risk and uncertainty 
are involved. To determine the overall weights of a Al\lF decision making problem, 
one form first the superrnatrix W of the problem as equation (17) 
[ 
W u 
W = ~ 21 
W N1 
W 12 
W 22 W 1N l 2N 
W NN 
(17) 
where W ij is the weighting matrix of cluster i ,vith regard to cluster j obtained as 
in the case of analytic hierarchy process. The blocks of the supermatrix W are then 
weighted by the corresponding cluster importance with regard to the decision goal to 
obtain a weighted supermatrix W w that is a column stochastic matrix. The global 
weighting matrix n is obtained as the linliting power of W w as shown by equation 
(18) 
. k n = lrm (Ww) k-oo (18) 
if W w is irreducible and acyclic. In the case of cyclicity and/or reducibility, there 
,vill exist many linliting supermatrices W ~, let say L, and the Cesario sum (see [13]) 
is considered, equation (19) 
L 
. 1"'"' l k !1 = lim -L L (Ww) . k-oo 
l= l 
(19) 
The bloc O ij of the limiting supermatrix gives the overall priority of the elements of 
cluster Ci with regard to the elements of cluster Cj - A typical ANP is given by Figure 
3 and, let us denote by w , the weight vector of criteria with regard to the overall goal, 
W e the iner-weight matrix of criteria cluster, W 00 the weight rnatri.x of criteria ,vith 
regard to alternatives, W ac the weight matrix of alternatives ,vith regard to criteria 
and finally W a the iner-weight matrix of alternatives, then the superrnatri.x of this 
problem is given by equation (20) 
(20) 
Goal 
Figure 3: A typical .AN-P organization of a decision problem 
For a large problem, computing the limiting supermatrix may be time consuming, 
fortunately some soft.vare sucl1 as Super Decisions (see [19]) can be used to support 
a decision making problem in analytic network process framework so that one can 
concentrate on modeling effort. Vve are now ready to develop the SANPEV fram€\vork 
in the next section. 
4 SANPEV Framework 
4.1 Evaluation process 
Before establishing the overall performance model to compute the satisfiability mea-
sures in the next paragraph, let us first establish how these measures will be used 
depending on the evaluation goal; this goal may be to choose the most eﬃcient unit,
to rank units or to sort (clustering, categorization, ...) them. Choosing and ranking
are relative evaluation operations whereas sorting is an absolute operation (see [2])
that requires deﬁning norms and categories. From the rejectability measure p
r
(u) and
the selectability measure p
s
(u) for any unit u ∈ U , an evaluation or value function
π(u) is deﬁned as (21)
π(u) = π (p
s
(u), p
r
(u)) (21)
which will take particular form depending on the criteria that guide the evaluation
process and then, in the case of selection, the selected subset U
s
is deﬁned by equation
(22)
U
s
=
{
u : u = arg max
v∈E
S
q
π(v)
}
. (22)
If the evaluation goal is to rank units then one can deﬁne the ranking relation by
equation (23)
u  v ⇔ π(u) ≥ π(v) (23)
where “u  v” means that the unit u is at least as good as the unit v with regard to
the evaluation goal and ﬁnally diﬀerent norms can be deﬁned using this function for
sorting purpose; for instance, in the case π(u) = p
s
(u)−qp
r
(u), two natural partitions
of U are given by equation (24)
C
1
= Σ
q
= {u ∈ U : π(u) ≥ 0} and C
2
= U − C
1
. (24)
Besides this possibility of sorting, the satisﬁcing game approach leads to a natural
categorization of the alternatives set U into four subsets, namely E
S
q
, E −E
S
q
, Σ
q
−E
S
q
,
and U − Σ
q
∪ E . In terms of preference the subset E
S
q
is obviously preferred to the
rest; it contains alternatives arguable to be “good enough” (their selectability exceeds
their rejectability and there are no alternatives that are better than them) and the
set U − Σ
q
∪ E contains completely ineﬃcient alternatives (they are not satisﬁcing
alternatives nor equilibrium); there is no obvious conclusion for the subsets E − E
S
q
and Σ
q
− E
S
q
and a sensitivity analysis can be done for these alternatives (see for
instance [20]). This dominance scheme is shown on the following Figure 4. Some
Σ
q 
-
q
s
- 
q
s
q
s
− Σ
q 
∪ 
satisficing 
equilibrium
satisficing 
but not equilibrium
equilibrium
but not satisficing
not satisficing 
nor equilibrium
Figure 4: Dominance scheme of satisﬁcing categorization process
, , 
u 
of the criteria that can guide the ﬁnal ordering of each category of alternatives are
discussed in the following.
4.1.1 Input/output trade-oﬀ criterion
This is certainly the most intuitive criterion, that is one will compare the selectability
measure and the rejectability measure, the evaluation function can then be deﬁned
by equation (25)
π(u) = p
s
(u)− qp
r
(u) or π(u) =
p
s
(u)
p
r
(u)
(25)
that gives the priority to alternatives with large diﬀerence between the selectability
measure and the rejectability measure given the index of caution or that considers
alternatives with the largest index of caution.
4.1.2 Input or output insensitive criterion
The evaluation goal may be deﬁned with regard to the output performance only (input
insensitive); this can happen if all the attributes available are related (or considered
as such) to the deliveries of the systems; in this case the evaluation function is given
by equation (26)
π(u) = p
s
(u), (26)
because the input insensitivity means that one can considered the rejectability mea-
sure p
r
(u) to be the same for any alternative u ∈ U so that the evaluation function
π(u) in equation (25) depends only on the selectability measure p
s
(u); that is the most
selectable units are privileged. On the contrary, the evaluation process may be output
insensitive, only resources consumption is considered for the evaluation purpose; in
this case the evaluation function will privilege the least rejectable units, that is π(u)
is given by equation (27)
π(u) =
1
p
r
(u)
(27)
as the selectability measure p
s
(u) can be considered constant (output insensitivity)
and as for a positive measure p
r
(u), maximizing −p
r
(u) or
1
p
r
(u)
is equivalent.
In the following paragraph we will establish the model that will be used to compute
the satisﬁability measures using the materials and relationships (stakeholders, items,
information sources and alternatives) that deﬁne the evaluation problem using the
analytic hierarchy/network process approach.
4.2 Modeling
The modeling framework consists in n alternatives or units to be evaluated, m
i
items
at the input and m
o
items at the output, h stakeholders and s data or information
sources. We will begin by establishing the model in the case of pure hierarchy where
independent stakeholders express their opinions or preferences about the items and
perfect data concerning these items for each alternative are available. In the second
case we will consider more complex relationships (mainly dependence and feedback)
among evaluation process elements.
4.2.1 Pure hierarchy: linearity
In this paragraph we consider the case of pure hierarchy where stakeholders
2
(experts,
decision makers, users, ...) express their concerns or visions about items that char-
acterize the alternatives or units to be evaluated without feedback (stakeholders are
not evaluated with regard to items). Furthermore, we consider that the input/output
items are either numerically valued (strictly positive values or rendered strictly pos-
itive by some transformation) and data are supplied by a reliable source (this case,
without considering stakeholders, corresponds to the case where DEA approach can
be applied) or alternatives can be compared with regard to items by reliable experts.
The transformation that renders the valuation of input/output items positive numeric
is considered in the framework of utility theory where it is known that utilities are
unique only up to a positive aﬃne transformation (see for instance [15]), so that this
transformation will be given by the following equation (28)
×(u, i)←
×(u, i)−min
v∈U
{×(v, i)}
max
v∈U
{×(v, i)} −min
v∈U
{×(v, i)}
(28)
where × stands for I or O and I(u, i) (respectively O(u, i)) is the value (measured
or assigned in ordinal form by an authorized expert) of input item i (respectively
output item i) for the alternative u. It is then straightforward to derive an algorithm
to compute the rejectability measure p
r
related to what happen at the input and
the selectability measure p
s
that corresponds to the output performance using the
analytic hierarchy process as shown by Figure 5. Let us denote by W
k
IS,I
(respect.
W
k
IS,O
), for k = 1, 2, .., h, the pairwise comparison matrix of input (respect. output)
items according to the stakeholders k that supplies weights w
k
ij
(how important is
item i compared to j according to stakeholder k?). One rapid way
3
to obtain this
matrix is to ask the stakeholder to choose a pivot item p and compare other items to
it using the standard AHP scales by supplying weights w
k
ip
(how important is item
i compared to the pivot item p according to stakeholder k?). Then one construct a
consistent comparison matrix W
k
IS,×
using the relations deﬁned by equations (29) -
(30)
W
k
IS,×
(i, i) = 1, W
k
IS,×
(i, p) = w
ip
, W
k
IS,×
(p, i) =
1
w
ip
, (29)
2
One can imagine that the stakeholders who judge the input items are not necessarily those who
judge the ouput items.
3
This rapid way of constructing the pairwise comparison matrices W
k
IS,×
ensures to obtain con-
sistent matrices. Of course nothing prevents stakeholders of using the general way of pairwise
comaprison matrix construction (with inconsistency checking) to obtain these matrices and use the
equation (31) to compute the weight vectors ω
k
IS,×
.
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Figure 5: SANPEV architecture in the case of pur hierarchy
W
k
IS,×
(i, j) =W
k
IS,×
(i, l) ·W
k
IS,×
(l, j). (30)
Once these matrices are obtained, the column weight vectors ω
k
SI,I
and ω
k
SI,O
for
items according to each stakeholder k are computed as shown by equation (31)
ω
k
IS,×
(i) =
1
m
×
m
×
∑
j=1
(
W
k
IS,×
(i, j)
∑
m
×
l=1
W
k
IS,×
(l, j)
)
, i = 1, ..,m
×
, k = 1, .., h, × = I, O
(31)
and the m
i
× h (respect. m
o
× h) weighting matrixW
IS,I
(respect. W
IS,O
) is given
by equation (32)
W
IS,I
=
[
ω
1
IS,I
ω
2
IS,I
... ω
h
IS,I
]
andW
IS,O
=
[
ω
1
IS,O
ω
2
IS,O
... ω
h
IS,O
]
.
(32)
Now we must compute the weighting matrix W
AI,×
of alternatives with regard to
items. To do so, we suppose that either reliable experts are able to supply matrices
W
i
AI,×
(u, v) that measure the relative importance of alternatives with regard to items
or one dispose of positive values I(u, i) (respectively O(u, j)) the value of input item
i (respectively output item j) for the alternative u so that the pairwise comparison
matricesW
i
AI,I
andW
j
AI,O
for the input item i and output item j are given by the
equation (33)
W
i
AI,I
(u, v) =
I(u, i)
I(v, i)
andW
j
AI,O
(u, v) =
O(u, j)
O(v, j)
. (33)
The weight vectors ω
i
AI,I
(for the input item i) and ω
j
AI,O
(for the output item j)
are given by equation (34)
ω
i
AI,×
(u) =
1
n
n
∑
v=1
(
W
i
AI,×
(u, v)
∑
n
w=1
W
i
AI,×
(w, v)
)
, i = 1, .., n, × = I, O (34)
and ﬁnally the n ×m
i
input weighting matrix W
AI,I
and n ×m
o
output weighting
matrixW
AI,O
are given by the following equation (35)
W
AI,I
=
[
ω
1
AI,I
ω
2
AI,I
... ω
m
i
AI,I
]
andW
AI,O
=
[
ω
1
AI,O
ω
2
AI,O
... ω
m
o
AI,O
]
.
(35)
Let us denote by ω
I
and ω
O
, h dimension column vectors representing the relative
importance of stakeholders at the system input/output respectively with regard to
evaluation goal, then the following proposition gives the rejectability measure p
r
(u)
and the selectability measure p
s
(u).
Proposition 2 The rejectability measure p
r
(u) and the selectability measure p
s
(u)
for the alternative u are obtained by the following equation (36)
p
r
(u) = [W
AI,I
·W
IS,I
· ω
I
]
u
and p
s
(u) = [W
AI,O
·W
IS,O
· ω
O
]
u
. (36)
Application To show the potentiality of the model established previously, let us
consider a real world problem from DEA literature. The purpose of this problem is to
measure the eﬃciency of 20 hospitals (see [4]) that are characterized by the number
of minor and acute treated cases as the output items and the full time equivalent
nursing staﬀ and the number of beds as the resources (input items). Data collected
are shown on the following table (Table II).
Hospital Output items Input items
Minor cases Acute cases Nurses Beds
01 150 50 200 600
02 225 75 600 1200
03 90 10 200 200
04 160 40 600 300
05 50 50 500 200
06 75 75 320 150
07 200 50 375 450
08 350 100 400 320
09 400 90 550 480
10 250 300 900 660
11 350 350 850 720
12 350 400 720 940
13 275 375 900 850
14 220 40 250 370
15 300 10 115 250
16 320 275 600 590
17 375 230 550 710
18 230 50 200 280
19 290 90 450 410
20 360 70 415 575
Table II: input/output data for hospitals example
Applying the model established here when considering all items from each category
(input or output) to be with equal importance leads to satisﬁability measures shown
on the Table III where we show also the eﬃciency index obtained by DEA approach
in the original study [4].
Hospital number Eﬃciency (DEA) p
s
p
r
01 0.63 0.0241 0.0396
02 0.31 0.0361 0.0895
03 0.39 0.0108 0.0201
04 0.48 0.0232 0.0456
05 0.50 0.0141 0.0355
06 1.00 0.0212 0.0238
07 0.46 0.0291 0.0413
08 1.00 0.0531 0.0362
09 0.75 0.0563 0.0518
10 0.93 0.0797 0.0786
11 1.00 0.0988 0.0789
12 1.00 0.1080 0.0830
13 0.94 0.0959 0.0879
14 0.59 0.0301 0.0309
15 1.00 0.0317 0.0181
16 1.00 0.0821 0.0597
17 0.90 0.0794 0.0630
18 0.85 0.0320 0.0240
19 0.71 0.0453 0.0432
20 0.62 0.0487 0.0494
Table III: DEA eﬃciency, selectability measure and rejectability measure
calculated using pure hierarchy SANPEV model for hospitals example
Applying (6) and (9) we ﬁnd that q
min
= 0.3973 and q
max
= 1.7499.With a caution
index of 1, we obtain the following sets
Σ
1
= {08, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19} , (37)
E
s
1
= E = {08, 09, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18} . (38)
The hospitals 10, 13, 17 and 19 are satisﬁcing but not equilibria meaning that there
are some hospitals that dominate them.
• B(10) = {16} , the hospital number 10 is dominated by the hospital number 16
(p
s
(16) = 0.0821 > p
s
(10) = 0.0797 and p
r
(16) = 0.0597 < p
r
(10) = 0.0786);
looking at original data, we see that the hospital 16 performs more eﬃciently
on all items than the hospital 10 except for acute cases where it does 5 points
less than the hospital 10.
• B(13) = {11, 12} , the original data show a coherency with this domination
scheme.
• B(17) = {16} , the hospital 17 is mainly penalized by its beds number, a diﬀer-
ence of 120 with regard to hospital 16.
• B(19) = {08} , the hospital 19 is completely dominated by the hospital 08 as
one can see from the original data.
One can see that all the hospitals that are considered as eﬃcient by DEA approach
are satisﬁcing equilibria by our approach except the hospital 06 that is neither satis-
ﬁcing nor an equilibrium; it is dominated by the hospital 15 and one can see that it
performs among the bottom hospitals in terms of delivery whereas its resources con-
sumption is comparable to some of eﬃcient hospitals; we do think that it is declared
eﬃcient by DEA approach because of technical drawbacks of this method raised pre-
viously. We obtain the same results as those obtained in [20] with the same problem;
this approach has been applied also on many other problems, mainly from the DEA
database (see [5]) with success. Furthermore, the intervention of stakeholders can
be easily integrated. In the following paragraph we will consider the case of more
complex relationships among evaluation process components.
4.2.2 Dependence and feedback: network
For the majority of real world evaluation problems, the interaction between the ele-
ments in presence, namely, stakeholders, input/output criteria or items, alternatives,
data or information sources, may be very complex with possible dependency and
feedbacks. In this case one cannot use the linear hierarchy approach as in the pre-
vious paragraph but rather an analytic network process approach. As stated in the
introduction section, the considered evaluation problem consists in 4 main clusters:
STAKEHOLDERS: experts, decision makers, users, ...; ITEMS: input (resources) as
well as output (deliveries) items; DATA or INFORMATION SOURCES: news papers,
magazines, web, specialized journals, experts, agencies, ...; and ALTERNATIVES or
UNITS. There may exist a complex interaction between these clusters: stakeholders
can inﬂuence each other regarding the importance of items for the achievement of
the overall goal; the importance of items as well as the performance of alternatives
regarding each item may be viewed diﬀerently by each stakeholder or a group of stake-
holders. We consider the point of view of the analyst that must construct a model
to support performance evaluation by using existing alternatives and their evaluation
regarding the items and the opinions of stakeholders. The interaction between stake-
holders is considered with regard to their opinions regarding the importance of each
item; this interaction is resumed in the h × m
×
weighting matrix W
SI,×
obtained
using procedure similar to pure hierarchy case. Conversely items will be compared ac-
cording to the stakeholders opinions to obtain the m
×
× h weighting matrixW
IS,×
.
The architecture of the overall model is shown on Figure 6 where a ﬁfth cluster named
ITEMS_SOURCES is added for modeling convenience. The (m
×
d
×
4
)×m
×
matrix
W
ISI,×
and (m
×
d
×
)×d
×
matrixW
ISD,×
on Figure 6 that traduce the neutral eﬀect
4
d
×
is the number of data sources (input or output)
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of items cluster and data sources cluster respectively on the ﬁctive items_sources clus-
ter will be formed by the same column vectors to mean equal importance. Finally the
alternatives are compared with regard to items_sources in terms of “how well does
perform the alternative u compared to the alternative v with regard to item i accord-
ing to data source s?”and the results stocked in the n × (m
×
d
×
) weighting matrix
W
AIS,×
and the column vector ω
×
indicates the relative importance of stakeholders
with regard to the evaluation goal. The overall supermatrix W
×
of the established
model is then given by equation (39)
W
×
=











EG ST IT DS IS AL
EG 0 0 0 0 0 0
ST ω
×
0 W
SI,×
0 0 0
IT 0 W
IS,×
0 0 0 0
DS 0 0 W
DI,×
0 0 0
IS 0 0 W
ISI,×
W
ISD,×
0 0
AL 0 0 0 0 W
AIS,×
0











(39)
where EG, ST, IT, DS, IS and AL mean evaluation goal, stakeholders, items, data
(or information) sources, items_sources and alternatives respectively. The weighted
supermatrix and ﬁnally the limiting supermatrix Ω
×
are obtained as presented in
the third section, possibly using a software such as Super Decisions. Notice that in
fact two such architectures will be constructed: one at the input of the system to
measure the eﬀect of resources consumption for each alternative that lead to the
rejectability mass function p
r
(u) (for this input architecture the comparison of items
with regard to stakeholders opinion is judged negatively) and a second architecture
at the output of the system to measure the delivery performance where the items will
be judged positively and the result will lead to the selectability mass function p
s
(u).
The following proposition gives the satisﬁability measures.
Proposition 3 The rejectability measure vector p
r
(respect. the selectability measure
vector p
s
) is constituted by the normalized n last values of the ﬁrst column of limiting
supermatrix Ω
r
(respect. Ω
s
).
In the following section, we will present potential applications, in diﬀerent engi-
neering domains, of the method developed in this paper.
5 Applications
5.1 Potential application domains
The approach presented so far can be applied in diﬀerent domains such as the follow-
ing.
• Environment and geography: sites selection for locating infrastructures (roads,
airports, power plants, waste management facility, ...) where stakeholders may
consist in politicians, public administration, local community, economic asso-
ciations, environmental associations, ...; items can be considered to reﬂect en-
vironmental impact, socioeconomic development, the realization cost, technical
feasibility and reliability, ...; information sources may consist in domain experts
opinion, economic and/or environment agencies or cabinets, ...
• Manufacturing and service: evaluation of production/service units (manufac-
turing plants, banks, hospitals, call centers, ...) for their performance and/or
activity restructuring purpose for instance. Here input/output items will be
naturally deﬁned by the resources consumed and the throughput whereas stake-
holders may consist in group of actors reﬂecting the concerns and hopes of
production team, maintenance team, sales team, managers, ....
• Management (strategy and marketing): the problem may be to select new
projects or products for a company, to reorganize or to restructure the activi-
ties of a company, investing in researches and development, ... Here stakeholders
will be the board of governors, the managers, the unions and personnels, ... and
items may be investment cost, short/long term return, notoriety impact, impact
on the environment, advertising cost, beneﬁce, .... and the information sources
will be specialized magazines, stock exchanges behavior over a certain horizon,
other companies, ....
• Human resources management: choosing appropriate candidates for appropriate
jobs is a crucial objective for human resources managers. The stakeholders here
will be the managers, targeted team manager, future colleagues, ...; items may
be qualiﬁcations, communication skills, experience, ... and information sources
can be the opinion of past employers, past colleagues, attended education insti-
tutions, ...
• Governments: any government in the world and mainly governments of de-
veloping countries face the problem of prioritizing its investment projects in
diﬀerent domains: health, education, infrastructures, military, researches and
development, ... in order to ensure economic growth, wealthy, human develop-
ment, ... for the population. The method developed here can be used in this
prioritization process where stakeholders will be government agencies, unions,
non governmental organizations, parliament, international ﬁnancial institutions
such as world bank or IMF, ...; the items will be naturally deﬁned by needed
resources for each project and the expected results; the information sources
can be consulting groups, international experts, benchmark projects from other
countries, ...
• ...
5.2 Illustrative application
To illustrate the potentiality of this method let us consider a real-world example
in the domain of waste management. This application is adapted from [14] where
the objective was to ﬁnd the most plausible solution to the municipal solid waste
management problem in a region of Central Finland. Here, we are just interested in
real data and testing how well our approach would have worked in real situation; we
will modify the original formulation of this problem to ﬁt our approach. A preliminary
study has identiﬁed 11 alternatives (see [14] for the meaning of each alternative) and 8
items that we regroup in 5 input items (items that correspond to an eﬀort, a negative
impact on the environment or a cost) and 3 output items (beneﬁcial items); the
meaning of these items are described in the following.
• Input items
— I
1
: net cost per ton,
— I
2
: global eﬀects,
— I
3
: local and regional health eﬀects,
— I
4
: acidiﬁcative releases,
— I
5
: surface water dispersed releases,
• Output items
— O
1
: technical reliability,
— O
2
: number of employees,
— O
3
: amount of recovered waste,
The evaluation of alternatives with regard to items is well deﬁned and row data
(indicating units is not relevant here) are given on the Table IV; in terms of SANPEV
structure of Figure 6, the nodes DATA SOURCES and ITEMS_SOURCES do not
exist.
AL I.I. O.I.
I
1
I
2
I
3
I
4
I
5
O
1
O
2
O
3
IA 787 155714560 148 364 505 9 20 4330
IB1 828 154887200 148 364 390 6 28 4080
IB2 837 154889339 148 364 390 6 24 5340
IC1 1062 139621200 201 377 370 7 35 11470
IC2 1050 139623330 201 377 370 7 28 12700
IIA 769 155061660 150 364 520 9 26 4330
IIB 861 154228170 138 364 310 6 32 5340
IIC 1048 138952170 203 377 300 7 36 12700
IIIA 894 154342000 137 364 470 5 25 3260
IIIB 997 153762000 137 364 300 5 32 4080
IIIC 1231 140035000 205 375 220 5 38 10600
Table IV: row data for diﬀerent alternatives of waste management facility example;
AL stands for Alternatives, I.I. for Input Items and O.I. for Output Items.
From data of Table IV, we deduce the weighting matricesW
AI,I
andW
AI,O
that
are given on the Table V.
AL W
AI,I
W
AI,O
I
1
I
2
I
3
I
4
I
5
O
1
O
2
O
3
IA 0.0759 0.0949 0.0815 0.0898 0.1218 0.1250 0.0617 0.0553
IB1 0.0799 0.0944 0.0815 0.0898 0.0941 0.0833 0.0864 0.0522
IB2 0.0808 0.0944 0.0898 0.0898 0.0941 0.0833 0.0741 0.0683
IC1 0.1025 0.0851 0.1107 0.0930 0.0893 0.0972 0.1080 0.1466
IC2 0.1013 0.0851 0.1107 0.0930 0.0893 0.0972 0.0864 0.1623
IIA 0.0742 0.0945 0.0826 0.0898 0.1255 0.1250 0.0802 0.0553
IIB 0.0831 0.0940 0.0760 0.0898 0.0748 0.0833 0.0988 0.0683
IIC 0.1011 0.0847 0.1118 0.0930 0.0724 0.0972 0.1111 0.1623
IIIA 0.0863 0.0940 0.0754 0.0898 0.1134 0.0694 0.0772 0.0417
IIIB 0.0962 0.0937 0.0754 0.0898 0.0724 0.0694 0.0988 0.0522
IIIC 0.1188 0.0853 0.1129 0.0925 0.0531 0.0694 0.1173 0.1355
Table V: weighting matrices of alternatives with regard to items for the waste
management example.
The main modiﬁcation with regard to the original paper [14] is that we consider
that some stakeholders opinion must be taken into account. In [14] a committee of
45 members were asked to express their opinion by assigning weights (from 1 to 7, 7
being the most important) to criteria and these weights were aggregated for use by
the ELECTRE III approach (see for instance [11], [24] for ELECTRE approaches)
to rank the alternatives. The ﬁnal accomplished alternative was the alternative IIC.
Here we consider that the selection process must integrate the opinions of diﬀerent
groups of actors that can be splited up as in the following.
• Political group (PG). This group is the group that will ultimately decide and
will be concerned mostly by ﬁnancial issues, jobs creation issues and the health
of their administrees.
• Technical group (TG). This is the group of actors that will supervise the realiza-
tion of the project; it is concerned mainly by the items regarding the technical
issues such as the reliability of the project, the eﬃciency (the amount of treated
waste), ...
• Environmental group (EG). This group may comprise diﬀerent ecological as-
sociations and will be more concerned by items impacting on the environment
such as the majority of input items.
• Beneﬁciary group (BG). We include here, the population whose waste will be
treated and that will beneﬁt of the jobs creation.
For output items, let us suppose that the political group considers the item O
2
(number of employees) and item O
3
(amount of recovered waste) to be very strongly
more important and strongly more important than item O
1
(technical reliability)
respectively and considering similar suppositions for other actors (see Table A1 at
appendix section for complete comparison), we obtain the weighting matrix of output
items with regard to stakeholdersW
IS,O
given below (equation (40))
W
IS,O
=
PG TG EG BG
O
1
0.0769 0.6522 0.1176 0.0909
O
2
0.5385 0.1304 0.2941 0.4545
O
3
0.3846 0.2174 0.5882 0.4545
. (40)
A similar consideration for input items (see Table A2 at the appendix section) lead
to the following input items weighting matrix W
IS,I
(equation 41) with regard to
stakeholders
W
IS,I
=
PG TG EG BG
I
1
0.3488 0.4478 0.0370 0.0588
I
2
0.1163 0.2239 0.1852 0.2353
I
3
0.3488 0.0896 0.3333 0.2941
I
4
0.1163 0.1493 0.2593 0.2353
I
5
0.0698 0.0896 0.1852 0.1765
. (41)
The groups of actors are also compared with regard to input/output items in terms
of which group opinion is more important with regard to each item and that leads to
the following weighting matricesW
SI,O
(equation (42)) andW
SI,I
(equation (43))
W
SI,O
=
O
1
O
2
O
3
PG 0.1029 0.5607 0.0781
TG 0.6564 0.1121 0.6245
EG 0.1313 0.1402 0.2082
BG 0.1094 0.1869 0.0892
, (42)
W
SI,I
=
I
1
I
2
I
3
I
4
I
5
PG 0.1193 0.0828 0.1212 0.0962 0.0962
TG 0.5966 0.1931 0.1515 0.6731 0.6731
EG 0.1989 0.5793 0.6061 0.1346 0.1346
BG 0.0852 0.1448 0.1212 0.0962 0.0962
. (43)
These weighting data are then grouped to form the output supermatrixW
O
equation
(44) and the input supermatrixW
I
equation (45)
II II II 
II II II 
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

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(44)
W
I
=
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




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(45)
whereω
O
=ω
I
=
[
0.250.250.250.25
]
T
(stakeholdersareconsideredtobe
withequalimportancewithregardtoevaluationgoal).Tocomputethelimitingsu-
permatricesΩ
s
andΩ
r
andextracttheselectabilitymeasurep
s
andtherejectability
measurep
r
,weuseSuperDecisions(see[19]),asoftwarethatimplementtheanalytic
networkprocessapproachtoconstructtwonetworksasshownbyFigure7.Theresult
Figure7:Outputandinputanalyticnetworkofwastemanagementfacilityproblem
constructedusingSuperDecisionssoftware.
(theselectabilitymeasurep
s
andtherejectabilitymeasurep
r
)obtainedfromSuper
Decisionisgivenbythecase2columnsoftheTableVI;thesatisﬁabilitymeasures
givenbythecase1columnsofthistableareobtainedwhenconsideringthepure
hierarchywithoutinterventionofstakeholders.
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Alternatives Case 1 Case 2
p
s
p
r
p
s
p
r
IA 0.0807 0.0926 0.0826 0.0890
IB1 0.0740 0.0878 0.0714 0.0862
IB2 0.0752 0.0896 0.0754 0.0909
IC1 0.1173 0.0960 0.1173 0.0972
IC2 0.1153 0.0957 0.1164 0.0969
IIA 0.0868 0.0932 0.0880 0.0902
IIB 0.0835 0.0834 0.0826 0.0832
IIC 0.1235 0.0924 0.1236 0.0945
IIIA 0.0628 0.0916 0.0628 0.0891
IIIB 0.0735 0.0853 0.0729 0.0862
IIIC 0.1074 0.0924 0.1071 0.0967
Table VI: selectability and rejectability measures in the case of pure hierarchy (case
1) and when stakeholders and items interaction is considered (case 2) for the waste
management example.
Diﬀerent categorizations of the alternatives set using the measures of Table VI are
given by the following.
• Case 1: pure hierarchy. Here applying (6) and (9) we ﬁnd that q
min
= 0.6856
and q
max
= 1.3366 and the following sets are obtained for q = 1.
Σ
1
= {IC1, IC2, IIB, IIC, IIIC} , (46)
E
S
1
= E = {IIB, IIC, IIIC} , (47)
B(IC1) = B(IC2) = {IIC} . (48)
B(IC1) = {IIC} because from Table VI we have
p
r
(IIC) = 0.0924 < p
r
(IC1) = 0.0960 and p
s
(IIC) = 0.1235 > p
s
(IC1) = 0.1173
(49)
and a similar inequalities hold between IC2 and IIC. Though alternatives IC1
and IC2 are satisﬁcing, they are dominated by the alternative IIC; the rest of
alternatives are neither satisﬁcing nor equilibrium.
• Case 2: network with equal importance of stakeholders. The application of (6)
and (9) leads to q
min
= 0.7048 and q
max
= 1.3079 and for q = 1 we obtain the
following sets
Σ
1
= {IC1, IC2, IIC, IIIC} , (50)
E = {IIA, IIB, IIC} , (51)
E
S
1
= {IIC} , (52)
B(IC1) = B(IC2) = B(IIIC) = {IIC} . (53)
One can easily verify from the Table VI that inequalities similar to (49) hold
between the alternatives IC1, IC2, IIIC on one hand and the alternative
IIC on the other hand that justify B(IC1), B(IC2) and B(IIIC). Here, the
only satisﬁcing equilibrium alternative is IIC that dominates other satisﬁcing
alternatives, namely IC1, IC2 and IIIC; the alternatives IIA and IIB are
not dominated but do have unfavorable input/output trade-oﬀ (they are not
satisﬁcing).
It is interesting to notice that the ﬁnal accomplished alternative IIC in the original
study [14] is the one that would have been selected by the approach presented in
this paper although the formulation considered here is slightly diﬀerent with some
arbitrary considerations.
6 Conclusion
The problem of constructing a model to evaluate alternatives characterized by mul-
tiple heterogenous negative attributes (considered as the input items that must be
consumed by the alternative) and multiple heterogenous positive attributes that are
considered as the deliveries of the alternative where multiple stakeholders must express
their opinions and information is collected from multiple sources has been considered
in this paper. The underlying paradigm for this purpose is the satisﬁcing game theory
associated with analytic network process; a systematic method has been established
that allows an analyst to calculate the satisﬁability measures (the selectability mea-
sure at the output and the rejectability measure at the input of the alternative)
using attributes values collected from information sources or attributes comparison
weights obtained from experts and other interactions inﬂuence expressed by compar-
ison weights. The categorization of items in terms of input (negative) and output
(positive) and the decomposition scheme of analytic network process make it easy to
carry up the one-to-one comparison. A practical example has been considered that
shows the applicability of this approach. The method established so far in this paper
is easy to understand and to apply with potentially many domains of applications
(the generic architecture of the model in terms of Figure 6 is easily adaptable to new
situations) but the necessity to divide attributes into positive attributes and negative
attributes may raise some problems in practice; we do think that this later point may
beneﬁt by works in psychology and other social sciences.
7 Appendix
PG TG EG BG
O
1
O
2
O
3
O
1
O
2
O
3
O
1
O
2
O
3
O
1
O
2
O
3
O
1
1 1/7 1/5 1 5 3 1 2/5 1/5 1 1/5 1/5
O
2
7 1 7/5 1/5 1 3/5 5/2 1 1/2 5 1 1
O
3
5 5/7 1 1/3 5/3 1 5 2 1 5 1 1
Table A1: comparison of output items with regard to stakeholders for waste
II II II II II 
management example.
PG TG
I
1
I
2
I
3
I
4
I
5
I
1
I
2
I
3
I
4
I
5
I
1
1 3 1 3 5 1 2 5 3 5
I
2
1/3 1 1/3 1 5/3 1/2 1 5/2 3/2 5/2
I
3
1 3 1 3 5 1/5 2/5 1 3/5 1
I
4
1/3 1 1/3 1 5/3 1/3 2/3 5/3 1 5/3
I
5
1/5 3/5 1/5 3/5 1 1/5 2/5 1 3/5 1
EG BG
I
1
I
2
I
3
I
4
I
5
I
1
I
2
I
3
I
4
I
5
I
1
1 1/5 1/9 1/7 1/5 1 1/4 1/5 1/4 1/3
I
2
5 1 5/9 5/7 1 4 1 4/5 1 4/3
I
3
9 9/5 1 9/7 9/5 5 5/4 1 5/4 5/3
I
4
7 7/5 7/9 1 7/5 4 1 4/5 1 4/3
I
5
5 1 5/9 5/7 1 3 3/4 3/5 3/4 1
Table A2: comparison of input items with regard to stakeholders for waste
management example.
O
1
O
2
O
3
PG TG EG BG PG TG EG BG PG TG EG BG
PG 1 1/7 1 6/7 1 5 4 3 1 1/8 3/8 7/8
TG 7 1 5 6 1/5 1 4/5 3/5 8 1 3 7
EG 7/5 1/5 1 6/5 1/4 5/4 1 3/4 8/3 1/3 1 7/3
BG 7/6 1/6 5/6 1 1/3 5/3 4/3 1 8/7 1/7 3/7 1
Table A3: comparison of stakeholders with regard to output items for waste
management example.
I
1
I
2
I
3
PG TG EG BG PG TG EG BG PG TG EG BG
PG 1 1/5 3/5 7/5 1 3/7 1/7 4/7 1 4/5 1/5 1
TG 5 1 3 7 7/3 1 1/3 4/3 5/4 1 1/4 5/4
EG 5/3 1/3 1 7/3 7 3 1 4 5 4 1 5
BG 5/7 1/7 3/7 1 7/4 3/4 1/4 1 1 4/5 1/5 1
I
4
I
5
PG TG EG BG PG TG EG BG
PG 1 1/7 5/7 1 1 1/7 5/7 1
TG 7 1 5 7 7 1 5 7
EG 7/5 1/5 1 7/5 7/5 1/5 1 7/5
BG 1 1/7 5/7 1 1 1/7 5/7 1
Table A4: comparison of stakeholders with regard to input items for waste
management example.
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